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CIVIL RIGIrS
Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188
Per Curiam
Dissent: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Dunn, appealed the dismissal of his civil rights claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which alleged that prison officials forced him to sub-
mit to an AIDS blood test, without a due process hearing and against his
religious beliefs.
The Tenth Circuit held that, because of the seriousness of AIDS
and its transmissibility, the prison's interest in treating those infected
and preventing the spread of AIDS outweighed Dunn's expectation of
privacy under the fourth amendment. The prison's lack of a current
medical program for AIDS-infected prisoners did not make the blood
testing policy arbitrary or irrational. The court found Dunn's allegation
that the AIDS test violated his religious beliefs too vague and conclusory
to sustain a claim under the first amendment. Finally, the court held that
Dunn was not entitled to a due process hearing prior to being
threatened with disciplinary segregation. The court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the claim.
Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1485
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiffs, inmates of the Penitentiary of New Mexico, filed a class
action suit against the defendant state officials alleging civil rights viola-
tions in the New Mexico prison system. The district court entered a
consent decree, in full settlement of the claims, and a jury trial was
waived. Defendants later attempted to have certain portions of the con-
sent decree vacated, claiming that those portions were not directly re-
lated to plaintiffs' federal rights. The district court denied the
defendants' motion to vacate.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court order. The defendants'
arguments that the eleventh amendment barred the federal court from
enforcing the decree were unavailing, since the eleventh amendment
does not bar a suit where the state official has allegedly violated federal
law. This argument was particularly weak because the defendants con-
ceded federal jurisdiction on the underlying complaint which was the
basis for both the lawsuit and ensuing consent decree.
Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1492
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiffs brought a class action suit against the governor and other
state officials, including the Warden of the Penitentiary of New Mexico,
alleging abuses violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A consent decree in settle-
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ment was entered into in 1980, setting forth rules and regulations which
would govern the defendants in their operation of the prison. The con-
sent decree itself has been the subsequent cause of further litigation be-
tween the parties in the form of motions to modify or vacate portions of
the decree or motions to hold defendants in contempt for noncompli-
ance. This appeal is from two orders of the district court granting attor-
neys' fees to plaintiffs.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the orders, noting that an award of at-
torneys' fees will be upset only if it represents an abuse of discretion.
The court held that defendants' arguments against the award of attor-
neys' fees were without merit.
Durre v. Dempsey, 869 F.2d 543
Per Curiam
Durre, a state prison inmate, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against employees of the Colorado Department of Corrections.
The district court dismissed all of Durre's claims.
Upholding all but one of the district court's dismissals, the Tenth
Circuit held that Durre's allegations of conspiracy to deprive him of his
constitutional rights were insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Durre's complaint alleging intentional taking and destruction of
his property by a correction official also failed because the state pro-
vided an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Allegations of indigency,
lack of counsel and confinement were not sufficient to show inadequate
post-deprivation remedy. No facts were plead to show that Durre was
unable, as a result of his pro se status, to follow the claim procedure or
proceed to court. The court ruled that Durre's allegation that a correc-
tions officer instigated and directed a beating of Durre by several other
inmates in the presence of the officer did state a valid section 1983
claim, but against that officer only. The court reversed and remanded
the district court's dismissal of Durre's claim against this correction of-
ficer, and affirmed the dismissal of all other claims.
Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882
Author: Judge Seth
Charles Edwards, guardian of plaintiff Craig Edwards ("Craig"),
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against defendants, Rees and Da-
vis County School District ("Rees"). Craig argued that his fourth, fifth,
and fourteenth amendment rights were violated when he was taken from
class and interrogated by Rees. Craig complained that Rees questioned
him about his participation in a bomb threat. The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of Rees. The district court reasoned that
Craig's constitutional rights were not violated.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court decision. The court
reasoned that the same relaxed fourth amendment standard involving
school searches applies in cases involving seizures at schools. The re-
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laxed standard is reasonableness under all the circumstances, rather
than probablecause. Using this standard as a basis, the court found that
Rees' conduct was justified at its inception. The court also stated that
the interrogation was reasonably related in scope to determining
whether Craig made the bomb threat. Consequently, the court held that
Rees did not violate Craig's fourth amendment rights. The court also
found that Craig was not deprived of liberty or property rights. In par-
ticular, the court stated that Craig's "right to be free from the restraints
imposed by the criminal justice system," his right to a public education,
and his right to his good reputation, without due process of law, were
not violated. Moreover, the court determined that section 1983 is not
available as a means for vindicating the honor of aggrieved plaintiffs.
Rather, it is a means for compensating substantial losses occasioned by
constitutional violations.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. General Lines, Inc., 865 F.2d
1555
Author: Judge Barrett
Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),
brought a retaliatory discharge suit against defendants, General Lines
and Bi-Rite Package ("Bi-Rite Liquor"), on behalf of two liquor store
employees. The district court found for EEOC awarding back pay. How-
ever, reinstatement, front pay, and injunctive relief were not granted.
Consequently, EEOC appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment refusing to
grant reinstatement. The court reasoned that even though Bi-Rite Li-
quor did engage in unlawful employment practice, a preponderance of
the evidence showed that the employees would have been terminated
even if there had been no discrimination. The court also held that the
back pay awarded fully compensated the employees so that the award of
front pay was not necessary. Also, since the EEOC. did not prove that
there existed a cognizable danger of recurrent discriminatory violations,
there was no need for a permanent injunction.
Ewers v. Board of County Commissioners, 874 F.2d 736
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Ewers, appealed the district court's summary judgment
dismissing his daim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ewers alleged that he had
been deprived of a property interest in his.continued employment with-
out due process of law. Ewers was employed as a road superintendent by
defendant, County Commissioners. Ewers could only be terminated if
there were cause or if the position was abolished. Subsequently, the
commissioners abolished the position of road superintendent and cre-
ated a position of county manager. This position entailed accomplishing
the same tasks that Ewers accomplished in his position as road
superintendent.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment
1990]
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and remanded the claim. The court reasoned that a property interest in
continued employment may be grounded in the personnel policies of
the employer that state an employee may not be discharged without
cause. In addition, the court reversed the summary judgment holding
that there remained sufficient facts in dispute concerning whether Ew-
ers' position was terminated solely for the purpose of removing him
without cause. The case was remanded for further proceedings on Ew-
ers' property interest claim.
Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Gillihan, acting pro se, commenced this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants, Shillinger, Shantyfelt,
and Bunch, who were warden, office manager, and central services unit
manager at the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Gillihan alleged that he was
deprived of his property without due process and was subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment. The district court dismissed Gillihan's com-
plaint for failure to state a claim and denied his motion to supplement
his complaint and several procedural motions. Gillihan's claims arose
from charges assessed by the prison for Gillihan's transportation and
the prison's subsequent freezing of funds in his prison trust account.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing
Gillihan's claim for deprivation of property without due process and in
denying Gillihan leave to supplement his complaint. The court affirmed
the district court's dismissal of Gillihan's claim for cruel and unusual
punishment.
The court found that Gillihan had a protected property interest in
his prison trust funds to the extent the monies were received from fam-
ily and friends outside the prison or wages he had earned while in
prison, and deprivation of property without due process gives rise to a
claim under section 1983. When deprivation of protected property oc-
curs under an affirmatively established or defacto policy, rather than ran-
dom or unauthorized deprivation, the state must provide a
predeprivation hearing. The availability of a postdeprivation remedy will
not bar a section 1983 claim. Because the record did not reveal the ne-
cessity of quick action by the prison or the impracticality of providing
predeprivation process, the district court erred in dismissing Gillihan's
deprivation claim.
The court further opined that cruel and unusual punishment arises
only upon deprivation of essential human needs. Gillihan's alleged dep-
rivation of "what little luxury" he had did not trigger the constitutional
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, and the district




Jackson v. City of Albuquerque, 890 F.2d 225
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Defendants, the City of Albuquerque ("City") and certain city offi-
cials, appealed the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, Jackson, in this em-
ployment civil rights action. Defendants contended that the evidence
was insufficient to find thatJackson had been retaliated against or termi-
nated because of his race. Jackson appealed the refusal to order rein-
statement of his employment with the City.
Following a detailed examination of all the evidence, the Tenth Cir-
cuit found it sufficient to support the jury verdict in all respects. The
court further concluded that denial of reinstatement was improper, find-
ing that comparable positions were not easily found and those hostile to
Jackson were no longer employed by the City.
Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706
Author: Judge McKay
Dissent: Judge Baldock (dissenting in part)
Plaintiff, Melton, a police officer for Oklahoma City ("City"),
brought a civil rights action against the City and members of a Discipli-
nary Review Board pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988, and
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. Melton alleged that he was deprived of liberty
and property without due process of law and that he was discharged in
retaliation for exercise of his first amendment speech rights. Defendants
entered six appeals on the judgment following ajury verdict and various
post-trial orders.
The Tenth Circuit held the following: (1) Melton's testimony on be-
half of a criminal defendant, Page, and statements to Page's counsel
dealt with a matter of public concern, outweighed the state's interest in
effective functioning of its public enterprise, and, as such, constituted
protected speech under the first amendment. (2) The court could not
affirm the jury's verdict against the defendants on the first amendment
claim. Errors in jury instructions made it impossible to determine
whether the discharge was properly based on Melton's statements to
Page's counsel or Melton's trial testimony. The defendants had no im-
munity for retaliatory action based on the trial testimony, but did enjoy
qualified immunity with regard to their recommendation of dismissal for
Melton's communications to Page's counsel. (3) Melton was given ade-
quate notice of the proceedings against him and therefore was not de-
nied his property interest in continued employment without due process
of law. (4) Melton received no due process before he was deprived of his
property interest in his status as a retired police officer. (5) The publica-
tion of charges against Melton, even without including the reasons for
his dismissal, impaired Melton's liberty interest in his good name and
reputation. Moreover, even though he was discharged on grounds other
than perjury, Melton should have been allowed to confront and cross-
examine those who charged him with perjury.
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The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a
new trial on (1) the liability of the City and chief of police for the depri-
vation of Melton's property interest in his retired officer status without
due process of law, and (2) the liability of the individual defendants for
Melton's claim that his trial testimony was a substantial motivating factor
for his dismissal.
O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F. 2d 1465
Author: Judge Brorby
In an action arising from a nighttime search of a-private residence,
the plaintiffs alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the author-
izing instrument was a daytime bench warrant for contempt. The Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court on this issue, finding that a nighttime
search without a nighttime endorsement on the warrant was unreasona-
ble under the fourth amendment because contempt is not classified as a
felony under Oklahoma law.
The Tenth Circuit then found the city and the police officers em-
ployed by the cityjointly and severally liable to the plaintiffs. The court
vacated sanctions that the district court had imposed on the plaintiffs,
stating that the suit was not frivolous. After reversing on the issue of the
constitutionality of the search, the court remanded on the issue of attor-
ney's fees and costs for the plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Phelps, brought suit alleging that defendants conspired to
publish defamatory newspaper articles about him in violation of federal
civil rights statutes, the first and fourteenth amendments, and the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The district court dis-
missed all claims for failure to state a claim.
Although the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 claim, the court stated that alleged discrimination of a white per-
son because of an association with blacks could be a cause of action.
The court affirmed all other matters except Phelps' equal protection
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Phelps had sufficiently alleged
racial animus in his amended complaint. Also, Phelps sufficiently alleged
a conspiracy, a discriminatory animus against blacks, acts in furtherance
of the conspiracy and deprivation of rights under the equal protection
clause so that elements of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) were satisfied. The court
reversed both of these matters.
Lastly, the court remanded the state action claim under 42. U.S.C.
§ 1983 with directions for the district court to further develop the fac-
tual record, particularly as to the precise nature of the state's involve-
ment in the publication of the articles. Among the factors to be weighed
are whether the actions of the former assistant attorney-general reflected
a discriminatory animus and whether he acted in concert with the de-
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fendants. These claims, if false, could be grounds for sanctions as re-
quested by the defendants.
Rozek v. Topolnicki, 865 F.2d 1154
Author: Judge Parker, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Rozek, filed a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Rozek alleged violations arising from an investigation that he had been
embezzling from his employer, defendant, University of Colorado (the
"University"). The district court granted summary judgment for the
University on the federal claims and dismissed the pendent state claims
based on the University's. immunity.
The Tenth Circuit found that the special prosecutor and the mem-
bers of his investigative team were entitled to absolute immunity and
qualified immunity, respectively. The court stated that this immunity ap-
plies in civil liability actions during investigation and prosecution of
charges, provided the conduct did not violate clearly established statu-
tory or constitutional rights. Moreover, the court held that the Univer-
sity and the Office of the District Attorney, were agencies of the State of
Colorado entitled to claim immunity based on the eleventh amendment.
The court explained that this amendment bars damage actions against a
state in federal court. Consequently, the court disagreed with Rozek's
contention that eleventh amendment immunity for states was abrogated
by Congress in enacting § 1983. The court held that to negate claims to
immunity, Rozek must prove: (1) the existence of "dearly established"
constitutional or statutory law that could have been violated; and (2) the
defendants' conduct violated that law. There was no dearly established
constitutional violation, and Rozek did not establish the existence of
genuine issues of material fact. Therefore, the district court's grant of
summary judgment was affirmed.
Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
This suit was filed under section 2 of Voting Rights Act, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, alleging that the at-large election proce-
dure for county commissioners in Saguache County impermissibly di-
lutes hispanic votes in violation of section 2. The district court found
that plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of proof for such a section 2
violation and entered judgment for defendants. On appeal, plaintiffs al-
leged that the district court applied erroneous standards and made erro-
neous factual findings.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, however, saying that a high level of his-
panic participation in the political process and the success of several his-
panic-supported candidates weighed- heavily against a finding of vote
dilution, and that where there are two permissible views of evidence, the
fact-finders choice between them cannot be erroneous.
1990]
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Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808
Author, Judge Ebel
The plaintiff, Starrett, a former county employee, alleged sexual
harassment against her supervisor, defendant Wadley, and Creek
County ("County"). The district court entered judgment for Starrett on
some of her claims. Starrett, the County, and Wadley, in his official ca-
pacity, appealed.
Following sexual advances and sexually discriminating treatment of
Starrett by Wadley, Starrett sought relief by speaking out about Wad-
ley's improper advances and his alcohol problems. The Tenth Circuit
upheld the finding that it was Starrett's exercise of her first amendment
rights that led to her discharge and affirmed the district court's judg-
ment that Wadley's conduct deprived Starrett of her constitutional
rights and entitled her to remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Finding that Wadley's termination of Starrett's employment was a
policy decision for the County, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment
for Starrett on her section 1983 claim only to the extent that it imposed
liability on the County for Starrett's termination; however, the court re-
versed the finding of the County's liability for Wadley's other acts of
harassment, determining that those acts were not officially sanctioned
and, thus, were not County "policy." The court therefore vacated the
damage award against the County and remanded for a new trial on the
issue of damages.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Star-
rett's Title VII claims and remanded for further proceedings after find-
ing that Starrett was not a member of Wadley's personal staff exempt
from the definition of employee under Title VII. The court affirmed the
district court's denial of reinstatement and front pay, and affirmed the
award of attorney's fees to Starrett pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; how-
ever, the district court's award of interest on the attorney's fees was va-
cated and remanded for recalculation.
Valdez v. City and County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Valdez, a spectator in state traffic court, was held in con-
tempt of court, arrested, and detained in Denver County Jail for four-
teen days. Valdez instituted this action for damages pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and County of Denver and various law
enforcement officers. The district court denied two of the officers' mo-
tions for summary judgment on the grounds of either "quasi-judicial" or
qualified immunity. The officers appealed.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the extent of government officials' im-
munity depends on the likely effect their exposure to liability will have
on the operation of effective government in a particular context, bal-
anced against the potential for a deprivation of individual rights in that
context. Enforcing a court order or judgment is intrinsically associated
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with ajudicial proceeding. The record indicated that every action of the
officers to which Valdez objected was taken under the direction of a state
court judge. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to dis-
miss the complaint as to the officers on the basis of absolute immunity.
Wulfv. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Wulf, was awarded damages for emotional distress, back
pay, front pay in lieu of reinstatement, and attorneys' fees in an action
grounded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Punitive damages were assessed against
defendant, LaMunyon. Defendants, the City of Wichita ("City"),
Denton, and LaMunyon, appealed the finding of liability, the amount of
damages awarded, and the award of attorneys' fees.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that
Wulf's termination from the police department violated his first amend-
ment rights, that LaMunyon was personally liable, and that he lacked
qualified immunity. However, the court found insufficient evidence sup-
porting the district court's award of punitive damages against
LaMunyon and reversed on that issue. The court also reversed the dis-
trict court's finding of liability on the part of Denton and the City.
Denton's actions constituted simple negligence, which cannot form the
basis for a first amendment claim. In addition, Denton, as an official
policymaker of the City, did not ratify LaMunyon's unlawful actions and
therefore created no liability for the City. The court found that
LaMunyon was not an official policymaker and thus his actions created
no liability for the City.
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